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GoVeRnInG InFRAstRUCtURe netWoRks 
FoR A LoW CARBon eConoMy: 
Co-eVoLUtIon oF teCHnoLoGIes AnD 
InstItUtIons In Uk eLeCtRICIty 
DIstRIBUtIon netWoRks
Ronan Bolton* and timothy J. Foxon**1
Abstract
This paper analyses efforts to promote innovation in the UK energy networks sector. 
Using a case study approach, we chart the co-evolution between technologies and 
institutions in electricity distribution networks since the introduction of 
privatization and market liberalization over twenty years ago. It is observed that as 
a result of macro level institutional dynamics, innovation has become an increasingly 
important policy and regulatory goal. However, efforts to promote radical and 
architectural innovation, such as the transition to a smart grid, face significant 
barriers at the firm and sector levels. It is argued that changes are required to the 
formal and informal institutions which govern the sector in order to promote a 
more coherent relationship between technological and institutional change, leading 
to a productive innovation system which allows firms to collaborate across the 
electricity value chain and develop inter-firm/cross sector innovation partnerships.
keywords: co-evolution; electricity distribution; innovation systems; smart grid; 
socio-technical transitions
* Corresponding author. sustainability Research Institute, school of earth and environment, 
University of leeds, leeds ls2 9Jt, UK. e-mail addresses: eerpgb@leeds.ac.uk (Ronan Bolton). 
Ph +44 113 343 6461.
** sustainability Research Institute, school of earth and environment, University of leeds, leeds ls2 
9Jt, UK.
Governing Infrastructure Networks for a low Carbon economy
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Volume 12 (2011), No. 1 3
1. INtROdUCtION
In recent years there has been a growing interest both within academic and policy 
arenas in the issue of how to restructure socio-technical systems, such as energy, water 
and transport, for the long term transition to a low carbon economy (Kern and smith, 
2008). as a consequence, efforts to understand the complex dynamics of socio-
technical transitions has seen the emergence of a body of literature known as 
transitions theory which has attracted significant attention (smith, Voß et al., 2010). 
However, as a recent special issue of the ‘Technological Forecasting and Social Change’ 
journal points out, transitions research has paid little attention to the specific case of 
innovation processes in infrastructure networks and their relevance to broader 
transition processes (loorbach, Frantzeskaki et al., 2010). It has also been argued that 
such systems and transitions perspectives adopt a structuralist conceptualisation of 
change and are thus poor at identifying specific causal mechanisms (stenzel and 
Frenzel, 2008). By drawing from the literature on the co-evolution between technologies 
and institutions, this paper seeks to explore innovation processes specifically within 
electricity networks. Our primary focus is on the interplay between technical and 
institutional change in the UK electricity distribution networks, and what lessons can 
be learned for the overall transition to a ‘smart Grid’.
like many developed countries, the UK electricity infrastructure, the transmission 
and distribution networks, were built in order to support post world war II economic 
growth and to accommodate large scale centralized generation technologies (strbac, 
Ramsay et al., 2009). However, the demands placed on electricity infrastructures as we 
make the transition to a low carbon economy will be different. It is likely that more 
renewable forms of generation, whose output is less controllable, will be deployed on 
the networks both at the transmission and distribution levels, and that demand will 
become a more active part of the system e.g. by being more responsive to fluctuations 
in generation output. This therefore places attention on the need to adapt the existing 
electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure in order to facilitate a more 
diverse portfolio of low carbon generation and greater levels of demand side 
participation. In order to address many of these challenges facing electricity networks, 
the concept of the ‘smart Grid’ has been proposed and is currently attracting much 
attention. although the term has been applied flexibly, it typically refers to the 
utilization of information and communication technologies across the networks in 
order to actively manage a system with high penetration of decentralized and 
renewable generation, along with higher levels of demand side participation.
Reorienting established electricity networks and developing smarter grids is not 
only a significant technical challenge, it highlights the issue of how to coordinate 
change within complex socio-technical systems. In the past, this coordination would 
have been brought about through hierarchical institutions with state owned and 
operated public monopolies. However, the relatively recent trend towards privatization 
and liberalization has seen the progressive introduction of market based incentives 
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and mechanisms, along with the fragmentation or unbundling of the value chain into 
competitive (generation and retail) and natural monopoly (transmission and 
distribution) segments. while the introduction of market incentives has seen rapid 
technological innovation in certain areas of the market, most notably in new generation 
technologies such as wind power (Garud and Karnøe, 2003) and CCGt plants 
(winskel, 2002), other segments of the value chain, particularly electricity distribution, 
have seen little or no innovation (scott and evans, 2007; Voß and Bauknecht, 2008; 
woodman and Baker, 2008). The aim of this paper is to examine the co-evolution of 
technological innovation and institutional change in relation to the recent history of 
UK electricity distribution networks, and to draw out lessons for current efforts to 
promote and accelerate a long term transition to a smart grid.
The paper proceeds by developing a framework for analyzing the co-evolution 
between technologies and institutions in infrastructures. It is argued that recent 
research on co-evolution, institutional theory and innovation systems provides a 
useful basis for the analysis of innovation processes within infrastructure sectors and 
a workable methodology for the identification of causal mechanisms which lead to 
inertia (lock-in) or change. Following this, using a case study approach and by 
employing qualitative research methods, we use the framework to explore how the 
governance of the electricity distribution sector in the UK has evolved since the 
introduction of privatization and liberalization in 1989. In particular, we analyze how 
efforts to promote technological innovation have become an increasingly important 
aspect of network governance, coming after a period in which economic objectives 
such as achieving short term operational efficiencies were given greater importance. 
Finally, we discuss the implications of the findings for the broader transition to a 
smart grid and draw conclusions.
2. aNalyzING eNeRGy systeMs: a CO-eVOlUtIONaRy 
FRaMewORK
due to the technical complexity, scale, and public good characteristics of networks, 
the governance of infrastructures has traditionally involved a wide array of societal 
actors including private utility companies, economic and environmental regulators, 
national governments, local and regional authorities, amongst others. as a 
consequence, infrastructure sectors have been viewed as socio-technical systems 
(Hughes, 1983; Geels, 2004) i.e. technical systems which are embedded within a wider 
societal context; socio-technical systems constitute a ‘seamless web’ of interactions 
between technical and non-technical components. However, this systems perspective 
has been criticized for its structuralist framing of energy infrastructures and for 
forwarding a functionalist account of system change, often neglecting the role of 
agency (smith, stirling et al., 2005). For example; stenzel and Frenzel (2008) discuss 
patterns of wind power technology diffusion in the UK, Germany and spain. They 
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argue that although the different institutional and regulatory environments had a 
significant role in shaping the initial stages of the industry, ‘the subsequent reaction of 
the utilities and their strategic adaptation to the regulatory environment’ was also a 
key feature in the three countries, particularly in the spanish case where this led to 
‘virtuous cycles of the development of firm capabilities and regulatory change’ (stenzel 
and Frenzel, 2008). This example points to a need for greater analytical clarity in the 
study of energy systems – structures/institutions and actors/firms evolve with partial 
autonomy, and although there is a dynamic interplay between the two, their relative 
influence changes over time and they are not reducible to one another (archer, 1995).
There is a growing body of literature which seeks to account for these co-evolutionary 
mechanisms that lead to long term change or dynamics within energy sectors. a recent 
contribution by one of the authors (Foxon, 2010) draws from the wider literature on the 
co-evolution between technological change and institutions in long term industrial 
dynamics (Nelson, 1998; Unruh, 2000; Perez, 2002; Murmann, 2003) and the socio-
technical transitions literature (Geels, 2002), in order analyze the conditions necessary 
for the uptake of low carbon technologies, and to explore transition pathways to a low 
carbon economy.1 For the specific case of infrastructure networks, the co-evolutionary 
framework has also proved to be a useful tool, in particular for the analysis of sector 
restructuring. drawing from the work of Oliver williamson (e.g. williamson, 2000), 
Kunneke (2008) explores co-evolutionary processes in electricity networks. He argues 
that changes brought about by the unbundling and privatization of the industry have 
created a mismatch between the institutional arrangements governing electricity 
sectors and the prevailing technological practices, which have typically remained 
unchanged. It is proposed that this mismatch between a large scale centrally controlled 
technical system with highly complex and asset specific transactions, and a governance 
structure based on coordination through the introduction of market incentives, has 
created tensions within the socio-technical system resulting in ‘an imbalance between 
institutions and technological practice’ (Künneke, 2008). Künneke et al. (2010) develop 
this framework by identifying a number of ‘critical transactions’ which are essential to 
the functioning of infrastructures; they seek to align these transactions with ‘critical 
technical functions’ in order to find appropriate organizational models for reformed 
infrastructure sectors.
The above approaches to analyzing the co-evolution of technology and institutions 
provide a broad framework for examining processes of change, and also suggest the 
need for more detailed understandings of both technological innovation and 
institutional change, in relation to energy infrastructure networks. Thus, in the 
following sections, we draw on institutional and innovation approaches that 
complement the broader co-evolutionary framework, in order to be able to examine 
the specific interplay between institutional structures and innovation processes.
1 see also www.lowcarbonpathways.org.uk/.
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2.1. INstItUtIONal CHaNGe IN INFRastRUCtURe NetwORKs
as we are proposing that technologies co-evolve with institutional change, an 
understanding of the institutional composition of network sectors is essential. For 
reasons outlined above (scale, technical complexity), institutional coordination is 
essential in network industries in order to safeguard system integrity and to promote 
efficiency and collective action (Finger, Groenewegen et al., 2005). a number of studies 
have proposed a layered approach to the analysis of institutions and institutional 
change within energy systems (Künneke, 2008; van der steen, Groenewegen et al., 
2008)2; here we draw from these studies and the literature on institutional theory 
(scott, 2001) to delineate three levels of institutional analysis suitable for this study 
(see figure 1 below).
Figure 1. Levels of institutional analysis: Adapted from scott (2001) and van der steen et al. 
(2008)
Macro-Level Institutions
Meso-Level Institutions
Micro-Level Institutions
Influence of the state, market and civic society in the governance 
of energy systems
Sector level interactions e.g. regulations, laws, value chain structure,
contracts, energy policies
Firms level decision making, organisational routines,  capabilities, 
strategies & learning processes
at the macro level is the broader relationship between the state, the market and civil 
society in sector governance. In the UK, recent decades has seen the retreat of the 
state from direct intervention in the governance of energy systems and a shift 
towards market mechanisms via an independent regulatory authority (Moran, 
2003). This contrasts with a country such as denmark where civil society actors, e.g. 
municipal authorities and communities, have played a more active role in shaping 
energy systems (lehtonen and Nye, 2009). This relationship strongly influences 
sector or field level interactions at the meso level; e.g. the privatization and 
unbundling of the electricity value chain along with the application of price-cap 
regulation in the UK has strongly incentivized network operators to reduce marginal 
costs and focus on operational efficiencies (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). at the micro 
level in our model, we focus on the firm. within evolutionary based theories of 
economic change the business firm, e.g. a network operator, is designated as the 
fundamental decision making unit; i.e. ‘the unit on which economic selection 
2 These studies draw from Oliver williamson’ s layered model of institutions (williamson, 2000).
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applies its grip’ (Nooteboom, 1999). decision making within the firm is bounded by 
its physical, financial, and human capital (Penrose, 1959), but also by its intangible 
assets, e.g. tacit knowledge stored in the form of behavioral routines (Nelson and 
winter, 1982). Innovation therefore takes place as a result of firm level decisions 
taken in the context of a broader selection environment and bounded rationality. 
section 3 of this paper analyses interactions between the three levels for the case of 
distribution networks in the UK. In the next sections we describe the different forms 
of technical change which take place in networks and how this is influenced by 
institutions.
2.2. teCHNICal CHaNGe IN INFRastRUCtURe NetwORKs
although there has been much debate in the literature on the creation of favorable 
selection environments for the uptake of various renewable generation technologies 
(Raven, 2005; Foxon and Pearson, 2007; Hekkert, suurs et al., 2007; stenzel and 
Frenzel, 2008; Verbong, Geels et al., 2008), there has been little discussion of low 
carbon innovation in the networks segments of the value chain (For exceptions see: 
Bauknecht, leprich et al., 2007; woodman and Baker, 2008). This may be due to the 
fact that, rather than having a direct impact on reducing emissions, ‘network 
innovations’ play a facilitating and enabling role which perhaps makes their immediate 
benefits less apparent. However, ‘network innovations’ such as HVdC links, smart 
metering, intelligent control devices etc. create more flexible and adaptive systems 
which in turn promotes the diffusion of low carbon conversion technologies 
(Mcdonald, 2008), and also can facilitate more efficient end use practices (southerton, 
Chappells et al., 2004).
In order to begin to address this gap, we again draw from the literature on 
evolutionary economics, particularly the innovation typologies of Freeman and Perez 
(1988), abernathy and Clark (1985), and Henderson and Clark (1990), to describe four 
generic types of innovation in infrastructure networks, see figure 2 and the description 
below.
Figure 2. Characterizing forms of innovation. Adapted from Henderson and Clark (1990)
Modular Innovation Architectural Innovation
Incremental Innovation Radical Innovation
Alters linkages
Maintain linkages
Competence
Destroying
Competence
Enhancing
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– Incremental innovation: This type of innovation involves updating or improving 
existing network components which builds on existing practices and an established 
knowledge base e.g. like for like asset replacements and network reinforcement.
– Modular innovation: This involves changing or adding components to the system 
but maintaining the design philosophy and engineering principles which underpin 
the architecture of the network e.g. expanding the system through an interconnector. 
Often modular innovations are carried out in a piecemeal or niche basis and do not 
substantially affect the core competencies or practices of dominant market players.
– Radical innovation: Component level innovations involving technologies which 
typically would not be associated with existing networks e.g. deploying ICt based 
control systems. Christensen (1997) notes that, depending on whether radical 
innovations challenge the market dominance and competencies of incumbent 
players, radical innovations are often confined to market niches but periodically 
can benefit from dramatic performance improvements and overturn previously 
dominant systems.
– Architectural innovation: This occurs when radical innovations change the existing 
network architecture or value network (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995) i.e. the 
relationship between technical (nodes and links) and non-technical components of 
the system. For example, the invention of the aC transformer and the rotary 
converter in the 19th century prompted a move away from small urban dC systems 
towards large scale aC synchronous systems (Hughes, 1983). such innovation is 
often controversial as it undermines sunk investments and embedded competencies. 
a dominant architectural innovation only emerges after a period of intense 
competition as in the transition from town gas systems to electric lighting in the 
late 19th century.
It is proposed here that ‘institutions play an important role in creating incentives or 
barriers to the rate and direction of innovation’ (Foxon, 2006); a key research task is 
to understand the specific forms of interplay which bring about different types of 
innovation in infrastructure networks. taking a co-evolutionary approach we focus 
on the relationship between technical and institutional change, the governance 
challenge being to find an appropriate ‘fit’ or ‘alignment’ (Finger, Groenewegen et al., 
2005; Künneke, 2008; Künneke, Groenewegen et al., 2010) in order to achieve desired 
policy outcomes (e.g. low carbon innovation). Below we briefly introduce the 
innovation systems literature where the aim is to create the institutional conditions 
necessary for effective innovation.
2.3. alIGNING teCHNOlOGIes aNd INstItUtIONs: a lOw 
CaRBON INNOVatION systeM
The task of developing an alignment or coherent relationship between technologies 
and institutions in order to promote low carbon innovation requires an understanding 
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of the process of innovation itself – here we draw from the innovation systems (Is) 
literature. lundvall (1992) defines an innovation system as; “the elements and 
relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically 
useful knowledge”. The concept – to create the conditions necessary for knowledge 
diffusion and innovation to occur – has been applied at the national (lundvall, 1992; 
Nelson, 1993), sectoral (Malerba, 2002), and technological levels (stankiewicz and 
Carlsson, 1991). This body of literature is quite extensive so we do not offer a 
comprehensive review here, however, there are two key concepts which are relevant to 
the creation of an infrastructure network innovation system.
Firstly, the Is literature expands earlier innovation models, which viewed 
innovation as a linear flow from basic scientific R&d to commercialization, to consider 
the wider systemic interactions that take place between a range of actors – as described 
by the innovation chain (figure 3).
Figure 3. The Innovation Chain
Government
Policy Interventions
Product/Technology Push
ConsumersBusiness
Market Pull
Investments
Investors
Basic R&
D
Applied R&
D
D
em
onstration
C
om
m
ercialisation
D
iusion
source: Foxon, 2003
The traditional neo-classical economic approach to innovation argues that due to 
knowledge spillovers and the ability to appropriate new technologies, investment in 
R&d is a market failure warranting public support – individual actors such as private 
firms lack sufficient incentives to invest (Foxon, 2006). The systems approach expands 
upon this argument and argues that as innovation systems are highly dynamic and 
complex institutional environments, in many circumstances successful R&d does not 
necessarily lead to commercialization, often due to an institutional selection 
environment which favors incumbent technologies. This provides a rationale for 
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continued support for new technologies along the innovation chain, particularly for 
the case of technologies which offer a potential benefit to the wider society e.g. by 
contributing to emissions reductions targets (Foxon, 2003).
The second relevant insight is the functions approach to innovation systems. a 
number of studies have identified the characteristics of successful innovation systems 
– how innovations move along the chain effectively. within this field of research, 
scholars have identified mutually dependent system functions which, within successful 
innovation systems, interact to create the conditions necessary for new technologies 
to move along the innovation chain from R&d to commercialization. In a 2004 paper 
by Jacobsson and Bergek (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004) it was proposed that the 
successful uptake of renewable technologies in Germany can be attributed to 
interactions between five functions which created the conditions necessary for mass 
diffusion:
– ‘The creation and diffusion of ‘new’ knowledge’
– to ‘Guide the direction of the search process among users and suppliers of technology’ 
i.e. influencing how firms and users make decisions regarding new technologies
– to ‘Supply Resources’ e.g. capital and competencies
– to ‘create positive external economies’ across an industry by creating linkages, 
exchanging information and knowledge through networks; thus reducing 
uncertainty, risk and creating synergies.
– The ‘ formation of markets’ for new technologies
The Is framework allows us to evaluate the innovation characteristics of network 
sectors and to explore the causal links between institutions and technical change. The 
next section of this paper evaluates efforts to promote radical and architectural 
innovation within an established infrastructure – the electricity distribution networks 
in the UK.
3. Case stUdy: CO-eVOlUtION OF teCHNOlOGIes aNd 
INstItUtIONs IN UK eleCtRICIty dIstRIBUtION 
NetwORKs
3.1. INtROdUCtION
Utilizing the co-evolutionary framework outlined above, we now discuss the specific 
challenges of aligning technical and institutional change to promote network 
innovation for the case of the electricity distribution networks in the UK. we do this 
in the context of recent efforts to promote a transition to a ‘smart grid’, as part of a 
broader low-carbon transition. we analyze the recent history of the co-evolution of 
technologies and institutions for UK electricity distribution networks, as this provides 
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useful insights into how the prevalence of different political and economic priorities 
influences these co-evolutionary processes.
although there are numerous definitions of what a smart grid is, it broadly refers 
to the deployment of intelligent control technologies in order to optimize the flow of 
electricity through the system from generation, transmission, distribution and 
through to end use – a definition which is often cited is that of the eU smart Grids 
technology Platform3:
“a smart Grid is an electricity network that can intelligently integrate the actions 
of all users connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both – in 
order to efficiently deliver a sustainable, efficient and secure supply of energy.”
The development of smart grids implies a shift from a largely centralized/large scale/
supply side dominated system, towards a more decentralized, flexible and responsive 
one; and depending on the degree of penetration of decentralized technologies, this 
could necessitate radical and perhaps architectural innovations. within this context 
we place a greater emphasis on the distribution networks due to the fact that they will 
likely play a more prominent role in future energy systems. However, in the past, they 
have received less attention than other segments of the value chain in terms of 
investment and innovation. In centralized electricity systems, infrastructure planning 
and operation has typically been supply side led with much of the system management 
taking place at the national level via wholesale electricity trading enabled by an actively 
managed high voltage transmission network. Consequently, distribution networks 
(and the demand side) have essentially been passive elements within the system. 
However, as increasing levels of low carbon and renewable distributed generation (e.g. 
CHP and microgeneration) is incentivized4 and as demand side participation in the 
management of systems increases5, the role of distribution networks in overall system 
management will become more important. However, there remains a great degree of 
uncertainty as to the role that distribution networks may play in the energy system of 
the future. In order to give an illustration of the potential range of possibilities, we 
refer to a recent set of scenarios produced for the UK energy regulator, OFGeM, which 
propose potential long term futures (2050) for the structure of the electricity networks 
in the UK (see table 1).
3 www.smartgrids.eu/.
4 The main incentives for low carbon generation in the UK are the Renewables Obligation, a market 
based incentive, and the new feed-in tariff scheme which provides a fixed subsidy for every kilowatt 
hour of electricity produced by small scale, low carbon generators (under 5Mw).
5 a key driver for demand side participation, such as load shifting at peak times, is the fact that the 
output of many renewable generators e.g. wind and solar power is uncontrollable and variable.
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table 1. summary of Lens scenarios (Ault, Frame et al., 2008): table taken from Pollitt 
(2010)
Big transmission and Distribution (t&D) – in which transmission system operators (tsOs) are at 
the centre of networks activity. Network infrastructure development and management continues as 
expected from today’s patterns, while expanding to meet growing demand and the deployment of 
renewable generation.
energy service Companies (esCos) – in which energy services companies are at the centre of 
developments in networks, doing all the work at the customer side. Networks contract with such 
companies to supply network services.
Distribution system operators (Dsos) – in which distribution system operators take on a central 
role in managing the electricity system. Compared to today, distribution companies take much more 
responsibility for system management including generation and demand management, quality and 
security of supply, and system reliability, with much more distributed generation.
Micro-grids – in which consumers are at the centre of activity in networks. The self-sufficiency 
concept has developed very strongly in power and energy supplies. electricity consumers take much 
more responsibility for managing their own energy supplies and demands. as a consequence, 
microgrid system operators (MsOs) emerge to provide the system management capability to enable 
customers to achieve this with the new technologies.
Multi-purpose networks – in which network companies at all levels respond to emerging policy and 
market requirements. tsOs still retain the central role in developing and managing networks but 
distribution companies also have a more significant role to play. The network is characterized by 
diversity in network development and management approaches.
a number of these scenarios, particularly where the locus of change is at the demand 
side of the value chain (dsOs, esCOs, and micro-grids), envision significant changes 
to the structure and role of the distribution networks. with these more radical 
scenarios in mind, it is proposed that the promotion of innovation in distribution 
networks will become an increasingly important strategy to deal with an uncertain 
future and a more prominent aspect of electricity network governance in the UK and 
beyond. In order to explore this relatively under-researched area, the remainder of 
this section deploys the analytical framework outlined in section two to chart the 
evolving relationship between innovation and institutional structure in the distribution 
segment of the market; following this we draw some lessons for future regulatory 
strategies and policy making. we focus on the UK in particular as in recent years the 
regulator has been at the forefront of efforts to incorporate incentives for the 
deployment of new technologies into the broader regulatory framework (this has been 
a key feature of its recent review of the RPI-x regulatory framework6), however, 
outcomes and lessons learnt may have relevance for other countries. also, as this is a 
rapidly evolving policy area, our main focus is on how regulatory incentives to 
promote innovation have been implemented along with the associated outcomes, 
although we do discuss the design of specific regulatory incentives.
6 The RPI-x@20 review: www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/rpix20/Pages/RPIX20.aspx.
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The study draws from over 20 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders 
within the sector including distribution network operators (dNOs), equipment 
manufacturers, academics, regulators and consultants. Interviews were recorded and 
transcribed, then coded according to three analytical categories outlined in figure 1 
and subsequently according to the functions of innovation systems identified in the 
literature (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). we begin by discussing the evolving 
relationship between institutional and technical change since the process of electricity 
sector reform was initiated by the electricity act, 1989, and following this we discuss 
some specific issues facing the commercialization of low carbon network innovations 
using the Is framework.
3.2. CO-eVOlUtION OF teCHNOlOGIes aNd INstItUtIONs 
sINCe PRIVatIzatION IN tHe UK
3.2.1. Innovation off the Agenda (1989–2002)
since the privatization of the electricity supply industry in the UK, networks have 
been operated by private entities under license and regulated by an independent sector 
specific energy regulator. The electricity act, 1989, established 12 licensed regional 
electricity companies (ReCs) in england and wales7, similar to the nationalized area 
Boards. In 1990 they were privatized, and along with owning proportionate shares in 
the transmission network, their role was to distribute and supply electricity in their 
respective areas. However, rather than accepting bulk power from a monopoly 
generator (the CeGB8), they were to transact in the wholesale trading market, then 
known as the electricity pool. although not clearly specified in the 1989 act, the 
distribution (and transmission) networks were regulated by an independent entity, 
then known as the Office of electricity Regulation (OFFeR) and subsequently merged 
with the gas regulator to form the Office of Gas and electricity Markets (OFGeM). 
Informed by the work of the academic economist, stephen littlechild (littlechild, 
1983), a form of price–cap regulation was introduced were the prices a company could 
charge for network services were index linked rather than tied to a specified rate of 
return on investments.9 Beesley and littlechild (1989) summarize the RPI-x regulatory 
approach.
“…for a predescribed period of four to five years, the company can make any 
changes it wishes to process, provided that the average price of a specified basket 
of its goods and services does not increase faster than RPI-x, where RPI is the retail 
7 The scottish systems were retained as two vertically integrated entities.
8 Central electricity Generating Board.
9 Price-cap regulation is generally preferred to rate-of-return approaches on the grounds that there is 
less incentive to over-invest in capital assets (averch-Johnson, 1962).
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Price Index (i.e. the rate of inflation) and X is a number specified by the 
government…” (Beesley and littlechild, 1989: 455)
Prices were set ex-ante each five year price control period and linked to the RPI, then 
outputs based incentives (the x factor), e.g. improving response times and reducing 
losses, were set by the regulator. From a macro level perspective it is not surprising 
that this approach to sector level governance was adopted. These reforms took place in 
a relatively benign energy policy environment, the job of regulation was to ‘mimic 
the market’ (Helm, 2004: 277) and RPI-x was viewed as an apolitical method of 
achieving this policy goal; this was particularly conducive with the broader neo-
liberal ideology the then Conservative Government (Moran, 2003).
In terms of innovation, the theoretical underpinning of the approach was derived 
from the schumpeterian view of the temporary nature of monopoly – monopoly 
power and above normal profits would act as an incentive to innovation and new 
entrants to the market (Helm, 2004). Innovation would take care of itself and the job 
of the regulator was relatively simple; to ‘act as a surrogate for competition’ whilst 
ensuring that network operators had the ability to finance their activities (Owen, 
2006). Quoting from shaw et al. (2010) the electricity act, 1989, describes the role of 
regulation to:
“..develop and maintain an efficient, co-ordinated and economical system of 
electricity distribution… and facilitate competition in the supply and generation 
of electricity”
Therefore, the role of regulation was not to promote innovation or favor particular 
technologies or methods; the focus was on reducing costs and promoting short run 
efficiencies. One interviewee from a distribution company comments on effect that 
the change of ownership and the introduction of incentive regulation had on R&d 
and innovation:
“what happened is when the companies were privatised in 1990, not so much 
when they were first privatised but certainly in the first price review when there 
were huge cuts in income with the RPI-x mechanism, companies who were now of 
course owned by shareholders did what they could only do, which was to find ways 
of reducing costs. There were several ways you could do that; the trouble is of 
course one of the things that suffered from that was to be fair R&d”
…and on the effect of the changing ownership structure in the sector:
“..in the past we have been owned by american owners who weren’t interested, 
they just wanted money, in fact they were asset strippers really to be honest…make 
a quick buck and get out”
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Compounding this, the fact that the privatized sector inherited a system which had 
benefited from a number of decades of over-investment under the nationalized area 
Boards, meant that the newly privatized entities simply did not need to innovate to 
any great degree in order to deliver on performance targets set by the regulator. It 
must be said that during this period firms did innovate by improving operational 
efficiencies, however, while the institutional changes had been dramatic, interestingly 
this had little effect on the technologies chosen. This can be attributed to two effects; 
firstly, privatized firms had inherited an over-engineered system and could easily 
‘sweat the assets’ without the need to innovate. secondly, the cultural inheritance of 
the nationalized industries remained embedded to some degree within the newly 
privatized companies. One interviewee from an equipment manufacturer comments 
on both the physical and cultural legacy of nationalization:
“The CeGB had this fantastic control of what happened to the network and it was 
very conservative and everything had plenty of margin built in… we’ve lived off all 
of those good things in the last 20 years and we’ve basically worked our way 
through all those margins…(but) there’s a lot of corporate memory there about 
conservativism, a lot of that is still there so things are very conservative in how it’s 
approached …”
This situation broadly continued following the 2000 Utilities act; distribution 
networks were separated or unbundled from other areas of the value chain in order to 
enable the introduction of retail competition. This led to the formation of specialized 
distribution Network Operators (dNOs). Not surprisingly, the key areas where 
innovation took place were in the newly competitive generation and retail segments of 
the market. For example, liberalization prompted what became known as the ‘dash 
for gas’, which saw a dramatic increase in investment in combined cycle gas turbine 
technology (winskel, 2002), and at the retail end, new ways of segmenting the market 
and developing customer offerings were devised (summerton, 2004). These innovations 
had little effect on the planning and operation of the distribution networks, and apart 
from limited incremental innovations in sCada10 It systems at higher voltage levels, 
RPI-x seemed to have buttressed and reinforced prevailing practices that were present 
during nationalization i.e.‘the legacy of past management perceptions meant that more 
efficient control of distribution networks was neither required nor a worthwhile 
investment..’ (Northcote-Green and wilson, 2006). Institutional change did not 
prompt any significant technical developments, and as a result, distribution networks 
in the UK became firmly rooted in a stagnation phase.
10 supervisory Control and data acquisition.
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3.2.2. The Emergence of Innovation as an issue (2003–2010)
as outlined above, the bulk of sector reform in the UK took place within a benign 
energy policy environment. This changed in the early part of the 2000s where, coming 
in the wake of an influential review of energy policy (PIU, 2002) and a policy white 
paper (dtI, 2003), growing concern over energy security and climate change have 
seen emphasis gradually move away from reducing costs and promoting competition, 
towards environmental and sustainability goals (Helm, 2004; Mitchell, 2007; 
MacKerron, 2009). In the area of network governance, the traditional role of the 
regulator under the original 1989 act had been to ‘protect the interests of consumers, 
present and future, wherever appropriate by promoting effective competition’; however, 
due to the wider dynamics in national energy policy described above, this has been 
altered. The energy act, 2004, introduced a secondary duty beyond the protection of 
the customer’s interests; to consider sustainable development in its decision making. 
In retrospect, this marked a significant shift from littlechild’s vision; an apolitical 
and formulaic application of RPI-x regulation. although the implications that this 
policy shift has had on the governance of electricity distribution networks has been 
quite ambiguous (Owen, 2006), one area where it has had an effect is in the connection 
of smaller scale distributed generators to the networks. schemes such as the Renewables 
Obligation, introduced in 2002, have incentivized investment in smaller scale 
renewable generators which tend to be connected to the distribution networks, rather 
than the higher voltage transmission network. This presents challenges for the dNOs 
as distribution networks have not been engineered to accommodate large numbers of 
dGs.11 The traditional approach to dG taken by the dNOs to deal with these 
connections has been on an ad-hoc basis, and to push dG towards the higher voltage 
levels; as one interviewee from a distribution company describes:
“anything that’s sizeable in the way of dG we can deal with on an ad-hoc basis if 
somebody wants to put 5Mw or 30Mw of dG on the network, it’s a bespoke design 
study and we do what we need to do to accommodate that, and usually that involves 
some conventional network reinforcement or at least an extension to the networks”
However, a number of influential studies, particularly from the eNsG12 criticized 
this approach, terming it ‘fit and forget’, and argued that dealing with dG connections 
on a piecemeal basis would be inefficient due to the cost of reinforcing the network, 
particularly in areas with high potential for renewables e.g. north of scotland. The 
alternative; optimizing a distribution system with large penetration of dG through 
the adoption of active Network Management technologies (Mcdonald, 2008), has 
11 dG connected to distribution networks changes voltage profiles, causing problems particularly in 
rural areas, and also by increasing fault levels on urban systems.
12 The electricity Networks strategy Group – Reports from the distributed Generation Coordinating 
Group: www.ensg.gov.uk/index.php?article=28.
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been proposed as an innovative solution to these problems (djapic, Ramsay et al., 
2007; strbac, Ramsay et al., 2009; Ochoa, dent et al., 2010). Prompted by these drivers 
and under the umbrella of its altered remit, Ofgem recognized the general lack of 
investment in R&d and innovation as a barrier to the development of a sustainable 
networks sector (scott and evans, 2007) and, more by accident than design, 
innovation in distribution became an issue; in particular the need to find alternative 
solutions to the connection of renewables at lower voltage levels. In response to this, 
for the fourth price control review (dPCR4) in 2005, Ofgem introduced a number of 
measures: firstly, an R&d funding mechanism: the Innovation Funding Incentive 
(IFI) – dNOs were permitted to spend up to 0.5% of its revenue on R&d – and a 
measure to promote trials of network innovations; Registered Power zones (RPz) – a 
dNO could spend up to £500,000/year and earn enhanced revenues for the connection 
of dGs. as Figure 4 below shows, the IFI did have a significant positive impact on 
R&d spending in the sector. It was a clear incentive where the risks to the dNOs 
were low.
Figure 4. Uk electricity distribution R&D spending
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The RPz scheme on the other hand was not so successful; only three projects13 were 
undertaken by the companies throughout the five years of the price control period. 
although the projects were relatively successful in trialing new technologies, as one 
academic interviewee suggests, they were modular innovations which were not of the 
radical or architectural type.
13 a project on Orkney operated by scottish and southern energy island deploying active network 
management technologies. Central Networks Boston/skegness project uses dynamic line rating 
techniques, and edF Networks Martham scheme uses enhanced voltage control transformers to 
increase dG penetration.
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“…it didn’t really come into that space. It was still very traditional but innovative 
way of operating a distribution network, I would argue, it doesn’t really address 
the market opportunities”
while another describes the scheme as;
“..a failure, there are only 3 schemes after 4 or 5 years. There’s no incentive for the 
network to try something why may undermine its business model”
Meanwhile, during this price control period (2005–2010), the broader governance of 
energy and climate change in the UK saw a number of interesting developments, 
particularly at the state level. Most significantly, the Climate Change act in 2008 set a 
legally binding commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 
80% by 2050 and 26% by 2020. also established under the act was the Committee on 
Climate Change whose task is to formulate five year carbon budgets and report on 
progress, 2008 also saw the establishment of the department for energy and Climate 
Change. These broader institutional changes, along with the emergence of the smart 
grid agenda and an increasing focus on the role that the demand side can play in 
improving system efficiency (predominantly through a planned smart metering roll 
out), placed the focus on more radical and architectural forms of innovation. as a 
response to these developments and the poor take up of the RPz scheme, in 2010 the 
scheme has been replaced by the low Carbon Networks Fund (lNCF). The lNCF is 
more ambitions than the previous RPz scheme, with the fund containing £500m and 
a greater emphasis being placed on more visible trials which engage with customers. 
The lCNF is about experimenting with new technical and commercial arrangements, 
and an interesting development is the recognition of the significance of collaboration 
and knowledge sharing:
“we expect dNOs to collaborate with each other and non-dNO parties (external 
Collaborators) on many of the projects supported by the lCN Fund. dNOs are 
likely to have to work closely with other parties in the electricity supply chain 
(from generators to suppliers) to explore what technology or commercial 
arrangements best address changes in network use and what role they can play in 
facilitating low carbon and energy saving initiatives such as dsM and dG” 
(OFGeM, 2010: 4)
This brief review of the co-evolution of institutional and technical change has shown 
how the issue of network innovation has increasingly become part of the governance 
agenda for distribution networks, and this has been as a result of macro level 
institutional dynamics rather than strategic decision making by firms. Overall, the 
experience up to 2010 shows efforts to promote innovation beyond R&d have resulted 
in minor successes and modular rather than radical change. The next section discusses 
this in more detail.
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4. lessONs FOR CO-eVOlUtION tOwaRds a sMaRt 
GRId
In order to identify the reasons for the mixed success in promoting low carbon 
innovation in the UK’s electricity distribution sector, we return to the functions of 
innovation systems introduced in section 2.3. For a competitive sector, these 
functions would be fulfilled through the interactions of market actors, but, for a 
regulated sector such as electricity distribution, there is a role for the regulator, such 
as OFGeM, to ensure that these functions are fulfilled. It is clear that, prompted by 
significant macro level governance dynamics, OFGeM have created regulatory 
incentives for R&d and trials, thereby fulfilling the supplying resources function. 
They have also been quite clear in creating incentives aimed at guiding the direction 
of the search, as the RPz program funded dG connection solutions, and the lCNF 
expands this to demand side issues. However, although R&d is increasing and there 
have been some isolated pockets of innovation, there has been an undoubted failure 
to diffuse new knowledge within the sector and create positive external economies via 
a productive innovation system. There are several reasons for this; for example, a 
number of interviewees pointed towards cultural barriers within the network 
companies themselves. Over the years, the dNO business model has been built on 
reducing operational expenditure and achieving short run efficiencies, the longest 
time horizon being five years. a large body of the strategic management literature 
(dosi, Faillo et al., 2008) argues that in such instances firms develop highly structured 
organizational routines based on tacit knowledge; where routines define a firm’s 
capabilities and are difficult to alter in the short term. as one interviewee points out, 
this seems to be the case for dNOs:
“… the network companies who are relatively averse to risk because they do not 
want to disrupt customers or do not want to spend money… they spend money on 
things which are quite well tried and tested. so that’s a bit of a cultural and business 
thing as well”
One specific example of this is in the procurement policies of dNOs in purchasing 
network components, which as one interviewee points out have tended to be quite 
conservative and least cost:
“(they) have this strong incentive to push down capital costs so they’ve put a lot of 
emphasis on negotiating at the procurement stage which basically means the just 
keep pushing down prices for buying basic standardised, well specified pieces of 
equipment”
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Relating back to the three levels of institutional analysis outlined in figure 1, it can be 
observed that significant dynamics at the macro level have occurred during the period 
discussed, thus altering the broader institutional structures governing activity within 
the sector. In the light of concerns over energy security and climate change, national 
energy policy goals have become significantly more complex and diverse than 
previously was the case, prompting a more active role for the state in sector governance 
e.g. the formation of deCC.14 This is placing a greater emphasis on long term policy 
goals and the low carbon transition, thus leading to an institutional mis-alignment at 
the meso/micro levels where the traditional emphasis has been on achieving static 
efficiencies. In the particular case of governing distribution networks, this lack of 
institutional coherence has manifested itself in a constricted innovation system for 
smarter grids due to short term time horizons, a lack of engagement with entrepreneurs, 
and disincentives to collaborate. although the lNCF is seeking to address some of 
these problems at the demonstration phase, key barriers to the commercialisation 
(formation of markets) of smart grid technologies will remain as long as the sector is 
tightly unbundled i.e. the different activities along the electricity value chain are 
carried out in separate business units. a systems failure exists due to the fact that 
individual firms, such as dNOs, lack the incentive to invest in technologies which 
may benefit parties across the value chain. New governance structures will need to be 
developed which take into account the distribution of risks and benefits of investment 
in innovation across the value chain. This will require new institutional arrangements 
which are more amenable to productive collaborations within the sector, across the 
electricity value chain, and with other technology sectors e.g. telecoms. In this respect, 
key lessons can be learned from the telecoms industry where, as the sector made the 
transition into a more customer-centric service based provision, linear value chains 
quickly evolved into value networks (li and whalley, 2002), as defined by de Reuver 
as:
“..a dynamic network of actors working together to generate customer value and 
network value by means of a specific service offering, in which tangible and 
intangible value is exchanged between the actors involved” (de Reuver, 2009: 12).
It is likely that as smart grids emerge and sector boundaries become less ridged, 
similar processes will take place in the electricity case. such a collaborative approach 
could help to spread the risks of innovation and to develop inter-firm networks for the 
sharing of information and knowledge. This will require radical changes to the current 
institutional framework, both in terms of formal rules and regulations which govern 
the sector, and also informal institutions such as the prevailing business culture 
within firms and attitudes towards risk taking.
14 department of energy and Climate Change.
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5. sUMMaRy aNd CONClUsION
This paper has outlined and applied a co-evolutionary framework for the analysis of 
innovation processes in network sectors. Incorporating concepts from evolutionary 
economics, innovation systems and socio-technical approaches, the framework 
focuses on a specific issue in the governance of energy networks – the need to create 
the institutional conditions necessary for the adaptation of low carbon network 
innovations. we highlight the dynamic interplay between technical change and 
institutional structures at the firm, sector and macro levels and how this enables or 
acts as a barrier to low carbon innovation. Following an introduction to the smart 
grid concept and its potential implications for distribution networks, the paper 
documented this interplay for the case of electricity distribution networks in the UK 
since the introduction of sector reforms in the late 1980s. It found that the initial 
stages of sector reform did not prompt any significant levels of technological 
innovation. However, in the early part of this decade, macro level institutional changes, 
particularly in relation to climate change, have highlighted a misalignment between 
the technological and institutional trajectories within the sector.
From our analysis of efforts to promote innovation in the UK electricity distribution 
sector, we identify two specific issues that are relevant to policy makers and regulators 
which might address this misalignment and bring about a more coherent techno-
institutional arrangement. Firstly, the need for innovation incentives to take a broader 
view of innovation systems and value networks. Until the introduction of the lCNF, 
innovation incentives in the UK were directed at the individual firm level. The outcome 
of the RPz scheme in particular highlighted the inadequacy of this approach both in 
terms of providing incentives to invest in technologies where the risks and benefits are 
spread unevenly across the value chain, and overcoming cultural barriers within a 
sector which is at the early stages of developing a capability to innovate. The lCNF’s 
focus on collaboration provides the potential to overcome some of these systemic 
barriers by helping to reduce risk and uncertainty and facilitating the diffusion of 
knowledge between parties.
secondly, the need to address the question of how to govern for long term 
transitions in the face of an uncertain future. The Ofgem scenarios outlined in table 1 
show that there are multiple transition pathways for the evolution of electricity 
networks, with some pathways based on incremental or modular improvements to the 
existing system, whilst other pathways would necessitate more radical and architectural 
forms of innovation. Our analysis highlights a number of significant difficulties in 
achieving these forms of structural change within a regulated sector such as electricity 
distribution. In order to avoid lock-in to an incrementalist path, the development of 
coherent visions and transition pathways, along with a clear commitment to the long 
term promotion of innovation and systemic change, is required on the part of 
regulators and policy makers. Focus needs to shift from the promotion of short run 
efficiencies towards alternative policy goals, and this calls into question many of the 
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underlying rationalities behind network regulation. effective smart grid governance 
will thus require a great degree of institutional reflexivity and institutional learning 
on the part of regulators and provides scope for a redefinition of the relationship 
between policy and regulation.
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